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Reintegration of Al-Shabaab’s Defectors in Somalia: An Examination of 
Conditions for Successful Reintegration 
Abstract 
This article attempts to examine an issue regarding the reintegration of disengaged Al-Shabaab 
combatants in Somalia. Nowadays, some countries have undergone current generation disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR), known as third-generation DDR; in the Somali context, although 
DDR is designed to disengage and rehabilitate defectors of Al-Shabaab for their reintegration into society, 
in practice, its implementation is not preceded by conventional approaches to conventional DDR, and it 
has suffered from various problems and contradictions. Previous research and information on the subject 
are extremely limited, due to a severe security situation. Accordingly, the author conducted interviews in 
Somalia in 2016 and 2019 with disengaged combatants and community members, to examine conditions 
necessary for good reintegration. The findings of the interviews revealed a gap in understanding between 
ex-combatants and members of the community, which significantly undermines the prospect of 
successful reintegration. A detailed analysis of the findings firstly shows that two problems exist 
regarding rehabilitation: a lack of knowledge, and an absence of accountability and transparency; 
secondly, further associated problems, such as severe unemployment, unstable security, financial 
difficulty, and distrust of the current government, which has devastating consequences for reintegration. 
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Reintegration of Al-Shabaab’s Defectors in Somalia: An Examination of 
Conditions for Successful Reintegration 
Yosuke Nagai 
By virtue of the changing nature of conflict in the world, approaches to conflict 
resolution have been transforming, to become more diversified and complicated. In this 
context, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), a significant element in 
the transitional phase (Muggah, 2006), has been developed to respond to various types 
of conflict and armed groups. As researchers and international organizations such as 
Muggah and O'Donnell (2015), Piedmont (2015), and the International Organization for 
Migration (2019) describe, there have been three generations of DDR: the first occurred 
in the wake of the Cold War, in the era of state-building; the second was borne out of 
the failure of DDR in Haiti, in the era of development; and the third has been developed 
in an era of radicalization. These generations have dealt with violent extremist groups 
such as Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, in a field where there are no preconditions such 
as peace agreements and minimum security, which are required to implement 
conventional DDR. 
Third-generation DDR is usually called for in the context of situations that 
involve counter-terrorist action and measures for countering violent extremism (CVE). 
Also, another notable feature is that this type of DDR is usually implemented in a 
fragile state, which has suffered from conflict, corruption, and a lack of capacity. This 
new type of DDR is aimed primarily at the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-
combatants in an active theatre of conflict with a violent extremist group, in which such 
ex-combatants were involved in the past; it has become a topic of serious discussion in 
the United Nations (UN) since the Evolving Operational Perspectives on Armed Group 
Management and Violence Reduction Workshop took place in Oslo in April 2014. 
Nevertheless, due to a severe lack of research, and no guidelines on how to approach 
third-generation DDR, almost all new DDR programs are facing various practical 
problems and theoretical contradictions on the ground. 
This article focuses on third-generation DDR in Somalia, which is regarded as a 
litmus test by the UN (Felbab-Brown, 2015a). It reveals obstacles to reintegration in this 
country, and examines what is necessary to establish a successful reintegration in the 
current DDR situation there, using qualitative interviews with disengaged combatants 
and people in the local community. The structure of this article is arranged as follows: 
first, it reviews third-generation DDR, followed by an explanation of the research 
design, and background information on DDR in Somalia. Next, the results of the 
interviews are presented, pointing out the serious gap between ex-combatants and 
community, which will then be incorporated into an analysis of the causes, lack of 
knowledge, accountability, and transparency of that gap. Accordingly, this paper will 
widen the scope of analysis on the topic to include surrounding problems, such as 
severe unemployment, security and financial limitations, and distrust of the Somali 
government, which have a negative influence on the prospects of reintegration. 
Third-generation DDR 
DDR has a long history, as there have been at least 60 DDR programs in the 
world since the late 1980s (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015). In first-generation DDR, 
which happened in the 1980s, former combatants were the sole area of focus, because 
the structure of conflict was simple, and there was a relatively firm top-down command 
structure. However, since around the beginning of the 1990s, modes of conflict have 
been changing dramatically (Duyvesteyn & Angstrom, 2005). New conflicts, known as 
new wars (Kaldor, 2013), are usually civil wars in which the boundaries between 
combatants and civilians, and conflict and post-conflict, are not clearly defined, and 
severe damage is inflicted upon civilians in comparison with conventional warfare. 
Along with such a change in modes of conflict, DDR underwent an evolution in the 
second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015; 
Piedmont, 2015) to be more comprehensive and flexible with more diverse and different 
types of activities (Piedmont, 2015; Stankovic & Torjesen, 2010). Second-generation 
DDR emphasises communities affected by violence (United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, 2010) to deal with various problems on the ground and 
successfully achieve reintegration. 
In such a second-generation DDR period, the study of DDR began full scale, 
followed by the establishment of a global guideline on DDR. In 2006, an inter-agency 
working group composed of 15 international organizations published the Integrated 
DDR Standards (IDDRS), which is the global norm on DDR, incorporating lessons 
learned from past DDR programs around the world. The IDDRS highlights the 
importance of a people-centered approach, as well as an integrated approach 
emphasizing reintegration, and proposes a set of conditions which should be secured 
before the initiation of DDR: conclusion of a peace agreement; trust in a peace process; 
willingness; and minimum security (United Nations, 2006a). In IDDRS, there are three 
different approaches to reintegration: “short-term stabilization,” “reintegration focused 
on ex-combatants,” and “community-based reintegration (CBR)” (United Nations, 
2006b). 
In some current DDR programs, however, the framework and reintegration 
approaches to IDDRS have become inadequate (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015; Piedmont, 
2015). Such DDR programs are essential in an active conflict involving new types of 
violent extremist groups, such as Al-Shabaab, ISIS, and Boko Haram, to disengage and 
rehabilitate members, and subsequently, to achieve their reintegration into society. 
Currently, this new method of DDR has started to be called “new generation DDR,” or 
“third-generation DDR.” It is true that there were some violent extremist groups in 
second-generation DDR, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sierra Leone, 
but the purpose of spoilers in third-generation DDR, such as Al-Shabaab and Boko 
Haram, is not only to replace current authority, but also to change it to a new form that 
cannot exist within the current world system (Fink, 2015). Also, in previous versions of 
DDR, it was considered that there was only a remote possibility of realizing 
reintegration during a conflict, unless a whole spoiler group ceased their activities 
(Torjesen, 2013), but whole groups are active, and also, security is limited with no peace 
agreements in situations of third-generation DDR. Additionally, third-generation DDR 
usually puts politics at the center, and consequently, it is typically integrated with a 
national policy of counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE), which 
shows that the current generation of DDR has now become established in a wider geo-
political agenda than previous generations (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015). 
In this context of third-generation DDR, it is difficult to use the three 
reintegration approaches of IDDRS, simply because they are supposed to be 
implemented in a post-conflict context with necessary preconditions. These approaches 
also regard the main problem of reintegration as the threat of ex-combatants; in third-
generation DDR, however, the threat to ex-combatants and the community are further 
critical problems (International Organization for Migration, 2019). Moreover, while 
IDDRS usually requires the same content for all participants, based on the principle of 
non-discrimination, the content of third-generation DDR, namely rehabilitation, needs 
to be tailored to an individual context (Felbab-Brown, 2015b; Fink, 2015). In addition, 
one of the major ideas in the reintegration phase of previous generation DDR, which 
allowed ex-combatants to join a national army, is not an optimum solution when a 
conflict is active, as the purpose of DDR is contradicted by returning ex-fighters to the 
battlefield (Felbab-Brown, 2015a). On November 19, 2019, after more than two years 
of revision, the United Nations released the revised IDDRS, but it only shows the 
reintegration support that needs to be done without preconditions, while complementing 
DDR-related peacebuilding activities: Even now a clear method to achieve this 
generation’s reintegration is inadequate. 
Research Design and Methodology 
In spite of the importance of research on third-generation DDR, little study has 
been done on it. Essentially, there is no one size fits all approach (Fink & Hearne, 2008; 
Silke, 2014), so it is necessary to conduct a case study in each instance. Although 
reports by practitioners of DDR in Somalia, such as the International Organization for 
Migration (2019) and Khalil et al. (2019) have been published this year, detailed and 
critical case studies on new approaches to DDR in Somalia are limited to the report of 
Felbab-Brown (2015a), due to difficulties in security and sensitivity. 
In order to obtain such information and consider the conditions necessary to 
accomplish successful reintegration in third-generation DDR in Somalia, the author 
conducted fieldwork in the Somalian cities of Mogadishu and Baidoa in July 2016 and 
April 2019, with the support of the DDR team of the United Nations Assistance Mission 
in Somalia (UNSOM). In the course of this project, the author conducted a total of 47 
interviews with 10 disengaged combatants, 20 people from local communities, 8 UN 
officials from UNSOM and the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), 
6 Somali government officials, and 3 private practitioners involved in the program in 
Mogadishu. The author, however, was requested by the Somali government’s director of 
the program to anonymize individuals, institutions, and donors related to the 
rehabilitation center in Mogadishu. Accordingly, this research will not reveal the names 
of the individuals involved in the program, given the possible risks to them in Somalia. 
In considering a concrete, detailed method of proceeding smoothly from 
rehabilitation to reintegration, the feelings and views of community members 
designated to accept ex-combatants in the reintegration phase are vital. This micro-level 
area has typically been ignored because many scholars, such as Humphreys and 
Weinstein (2007), and Muggah and O'Donnell (2015), have adopted a macro-level 
standpoint, based on a statistical and socio-economic perspective. 
On this point, this paper employs the grounded theory (GT) approach as its 
analysis framework. Grounded theory is crucial to establish a tentative theory about a 
social matter which is new and is not analysed with multi-tiered aspects (Glaser & 
Strauss, 2017). Because GT is flexible, it is suggested that a piece of research needs to 
arrange GT to frame a research question and a matter (Charmaz, 2014). Accordingly, 
this research set the research question, what are the feelings and recognitions of 
disengaged combatants and community members about the reintegration of Al-Shabaab 
disengaged combatants in Somalia?, to identify the necessities for reintegration in the 
third-generation DDR in Somalia. The data for this analysis was collected with semi-
structured interviews with disengaged combatants in rehabilitation centers, and local 
community members. 
The GT process in this research starts by slicing the qualitative interview data, 
followed by generative coding and categorizing to check the themes and variations in 
the data. Then, based on the codebook, this paper analyzes the matter and establishes a 
theory for the research question. By the nature of GT, in which the important point is to 
have a theoretical saturation, not just number of samples, in terms of sampling in this 
analysis, this paper reached saturation after interviews with 10 disengaged combatants 
and 20 local community members. 
With regard to the disengaged combatants, given the security issue and the 
relationships between donors and institutions involved in DDR, five combatants were 
selected from a rehabilitation center in Mogadishu, which was well-regarded by the 
government of Somalia and donor bodies, and five from a center in Baidoa, which was 
well-regarded by UN authorities. Interviewees were selected by the author, based on 
their age and length of participation in the program. With regard to gender, almost all 
participants in third-generation DDR in Somalia are male. Thus, this research focused 
on male participants. Given the possible problems and risks during a qualitative 
interview (Flick, 2009; Foddy, 1994), and the nature of rehabilitation, the author 
conducted interviews individually in a separate, private room. The interview began with 
an explanation of the purpose of the interview, anonymity, and the absence of harm to 
the participants; questions on sensitive areas, such as reasons for joining Al-Shabaab, 
were avoided, so as not to create tension. Also, with a view to encouraging the 
participants to concentrate on the questions and understand them, the interviews were 
structured in a way that kept appointments short, and avoided a completely open-ended 
question style. Furthermore, taking into account that building rapport is important to 
accomplishing a successful qualitative interview (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006; 
Flick, 2009), and also that only a single explanation of informed consent is insufficient 
(Bartunek & Louis, 1996), the author had an informal discussion in the Somali language 
with participants before commencing each interview, and also included an explanation 
of informed consent at the beginning and the end. In addition, to avoid bias by 
interpreters (Mehra, 2002), the author requested individuals who were not directly 
related to the problems under discussion to interpret each conversation in Somali. 
In terms of interviews with community members, considering the fact that 
community as a term is an abstract concept that has been neglected in social science 
(Plant, 1978), and also that the places which disengaged combatants return to are 
diverse and dangerous, the author focused on the City Palace Hotel as an interview 
location. Situated in the Abdiaziz district in the southeast of Mogadishu, which is one of 
the most popular districts for local residents, this hotel is a popular place for local 
people to have coffee. Interviews were conducted in the public area of the hotel, with 
the security support of the government DDR team. In terms of sampling, participants 
were selected by the author based on their age and gender. Also, in order to gain an 
accurate understanding of the feelings among community members, only those who had 
been resident in the district for at least three years were selected. In addition to the 
above-mentioned points about an interview method, the author clearly distinguished 
between “you” and the “community” when addressing interviewees, to enable an 
understanding of their feelings on issues as individuals, and as community members. 
Using qualitative data from interviews with these two types of participants, this 
article will attempt to define the gap between disengaged combatants and community 
members. Subsequently, using as reference other interviews conducted under normal 
conditions, and relevant literature, it will consider the conditions necessary to 
accomplish successful reintegration through third-generation DDR in Somalia. It should 
be noted, however, that there are some limitations to this research methodology. First, 
the qualitative interviews in this research were primarily focused on feelings and 
thoughts about reintegration. As such, it is hard to cover macro-level points, such as 
overall perspectives and trends regarding DDR in Somalia. Second, due to strict 
security, it was not possible to visit two other centers in Belet Wayne and Kismayo, as 
well as to visit each of the communities that the ex-combatants were to return to; 
accordingly, the result of maximizing differences (Norman & Yvonna, 2005) among 
sample participants was not perfect. Third, in addition to current security alerts in 
Somalia, because the author can understand the same trends in interviews with the 
disengaged combatants in 2016 in recent research data of the International Organization 
for Migration (2019) and Khalil et al. (2019), the author did not have interviews with 
them in 2019. Having taken such limitations into account, fieldwork was conducted to 
achieve the aims of this research. 
Current DDR in Somalia 
With the history of DDR for warlord militias in Somalia’s civil war since the late 
1990s, the new generation DDR started in 2012 as the national disengaged combatants 
program. The purpose of the program is the rehabilitation of disengaged combatants, 
and their reintegration, to thereby accelerate the further defection of members from Al-
Shabaab, which is the most powerful and notorious Islamic extremist group in the 
conflict in Somalia (Author, interview with Somali government officials in Mogadishu, 
July 2016 and April 2019). According to government officials and UN officials on the 
ground, there are currently three rehabilitation centers: the center in Mogadishu is 
funded by a donor government and operated by a private development company which 
is commissioned by the donor government. By comparison, centers in Baidoa and 
Kismayo are operated by an international organization and regional government 
authorities, such as Somalia’s regional intelligence agency. 
The subjects of the rehabilitation program are low-risk Somali defectors, who are 
assessed and assigned to it by the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). 
Assessment for the program involves an interview investigation, which takes anything 
from one hour to one day to establish the history and content of the activities of Al-
Shabaab defectors, their clan, family, personal identification details, and existence of 
any criminal record (Author, interview with Somali government officials in Mogadishu, 
April 2019). In 2014, some individuals of the UN and the media pointed out the fact 
that there were many children involved, and that Somali government intelligence 
authorities were utilizing them as informants to identify Al-Shabaab members (Felbab-
Brown, 2015a; Sieff, 2016a). After much criticism over this issue, all children are now 
being sent to the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, a famous local NGO, with the 
support of the United Nations Children’s Fund (Author, interview with Somali 
government officials in Mogadishu, April 2019). In addition, the relationship between 
the rehabilitation team in Mogadishu and the UN authorities has been strained due to a 
confrontation over the meaning of the program and the method of its implementation, 
which has involved the concealment of information on the program in Mogadishu. 
However, access to the center has been improving, and currently, UN workers are able 
to access the facility and program (Author, interview with Somali government officials 
in Mogadishu, April 2019). 
The period of participation in the rehabilitation program depends on the 
individual and may last from one month to two years (Author, interview with Somali 
government officials in Mogadishu, April 2019). Its basic content includes vocational 
training in trades such as carpentry, welding, electrical and mechanical work, masonry 
and sewing; there is also teaching, covering primary and secondary education, including 
civic education, literacy, numeracy, and business; it also involves religious re-education 
as a deradicalizations measure, and counselling. In the exit phase, participants are 
comprehensively reviewed in terms of their completion of some conditions for release, 
such as education and vocational training, self-willing, and medical health, and are 
sometimes tested on proper Islam by using the Qur’an (Author, interview with Somali 
government officials in Mogadishu, April 2019). 
Interviews with Disengaged Combatants 
Interviews with disengaged combatants first showed that there was some 
dissatisfaction about restrictions on meeting family members, such as wives and 
children. For example, Abdi, 29 years old, insisted his distress that “Here I cannot meet 
with family. (…). Very hard to go out and meet with family member here. (…) Of course, 
I miss them. I need to meet with them as soon as possible.” Notwithstanding this, all 
interviewees were generally satisfied with the rehabilitation program. In terms of its 
content, practical vocational training in particular, in areas such as mechanical fitting, 
sewing and carpentry, was to their satisfaction, as was basic education in areas such as 
literacy and numeracy. Adu, 21 years old, stated that “I was second (school) level. I take 
second-level class and tailoring. (…). Now I am studying them hardly everyday.” He 
also said, “Yes, Satisfy, really ok now (…) In future, I want to go to university. (…) I 
want to study Islam in university. (…) Any university is ok. I want to study more.”  
It can be said that none of the interviewees had negative feelings over leaving 
such a complete rehabilitation facility; their feelings were rather optimistic. Based on 
their expression and tone of voice, they had huge expectations for leaving the center and 
returning to their communities. One of the examples is Saku, 37 years old, who said that 
“Yes, they are ok, good. No trouble with them (…). We chat every day with them. (…) I 
am ready to leave already. Everything will be very ok. Now I’m just waiting that day.” 
Tikniko, 22 years old, also said that “Very good. Leave here, I feel happiness. Good life 
waits me. It’s better than here. I’m going to be happy. (…) No fear. It is positive. God 
willing! I can make it sure. (…) I can go now.” 
Disengaged combatants in the rehabilitation program firmly believed that their 
life after release would definitely be good; they showed a tendency to want to return to 
the towns and communities where they had lived before joining Al-Shabaab. Their 
intentions following the program were to work in businesses, or continue with further 
education, for example, through undertaking studies at university level. This showed 
that they had a tendency to want to continue with and develop their favorite areas of 
training in the program.  
Regarding their feelings about the communities that they were to return to, all 
interviewees had enormous confidence and an expectation that they would be accepted, 
although, conversely, two interviewees expressed fear and anxiety over their treatment 
when returning to their communities. In their responses at the time, many interviewees 
used the word “believe” to express their confidence without any hesitation. Bashir, 18 
years old, showed his confidence that “Reintegration is ok. No problem. I can do 
reintegration. (…) There is my family, friends, many. They wait me long time. They know 
my return to there, and I talked with them. (…) Yeah they were happy for me.” 
Additionally, words from Hussein, 22 years old, were that “I’m not Al-Shabaab now. 
Yes, I believe. I will explain, and they will accept me.” He optimistically explained that 
“My community is waiting for me (…) They understand me. My bad experience is not so 
much. I was in that community. (…) I believe I back there soon with brothers.” 
In addition, they generally had a desire to be a part of a community, and they 
viewed building relationships in a community as key to returning to society. Their 
approaches to creating such connections were diverse, for example: to respect; to work; 
to make friends; to not disturb; to explain; to hold orientation; and to stay peaceful. The 
narrative of Jacket, 22 years old, was that “To go back to my community, the important 
thing is, to work hard, don’t disturb them, and to be a part of community. (…) Respect 
for them is key. (…) When I do such things, no way to miss my reintegration.” His 
reason was that “Because they want me as a member there. They need me. Then I am 
totally ok. You same in your house and community.” 
Moreover, they emphasised the importance of preventing disengaged combatants 
from returning to previous situations in which they joined Al-Shabaab, where they 
experienced stress with businesses and relationship-building in a community, in order to 
prevent their rejoining a violent extremist group. For instance, Hamuza, 19 years old, 
said that “Alternative business to attract them is important to prevent rejoining. Then, 
accept and assist to join in community. If they are not in previous situation, they will not 
rejoin.” Asking about himself, he comfortably replied that “Me? I’m ok, never join 
them (Al-Shabaab). I don’t need to do. (…) I do my business and stay with family. No Al-
Shabaab now.” 
It can be noted that while the interviewees were awaiting their release from the 
program facilities, they were also considering various things privately. It is a fact that 
their responses were assertive, they expressed firm confidence and expectations based 
on their efforts in the program, and that they had a strong desire to become members of 
a community. Table 1 is the codebook of the interviews. 
Table 1 
The codebook of interviews with disengaged combatants 
 
Interviews with Community Members 
In general, all community members who participated in interviews were already 
aware of the existence of disengaged combatants. The reason why they knew about 
them was that their acquaintances or friends were disengaged combatants, or that they 
had heard about it on the radio or through rumours. As such, their feelings were 
basically negative, with responses such as “trouble” and “fear.” Female student Jomo, 
25 years old, said that “I cannot trust them no matter which position he was in. Whether 
he works as a service provider, or a carpenter, or a combatant, I cannot do once he was 
in there. Because they have same belief (as Al-Shabaab).” Some people simultaneously 
had mixed feelings as well indeed, which revealed a desire to make allowances for the 
Category Sub-category Description Data example
Content
Satisfying with the
variety of classes which
covered their lack of
education and skills.
I was second (school) level. I take second level





They are ok, good. No trouble with them. (...) we




Dissatisfied by the lack
of freedom for family
visit.
Here I cannot meet with family. (...) Very hard to
go out and meet with familiy member here.
Positive feelings to leave
the rehabilitation center
Expectations
Expecting life to be
positive.
Leave here, I feel happiness. Good life wait me. It
is better than here. I’m going to be happy. (…) No




as a simple process





accept him for sure.
I’m not Al-Shabaab now. Yes, I believe. I will





a member in a
community.
To back to community, important is, work hard,
don’t disturb them, and to be a part of community.
(…) Respect for them is key. (…) When I do such





Alternative business to attract them is important to
prevent re-joining. Then, accept and assist to join
in community. If they are not in previous situation,







fact that the disengaged combatants had already been disengaged. Medo, male, 30 years 
old, living in Mogadishu for 30 years, for example, expressed that “It is mixed 
emotion… Given what they did, I feel fear in fact. They could be a spy… They can 
attack again. I know such example!” He carefully described that “I know AMISOM and 
NISA and… will protect me. But, as personal level, I feel fear. It’s tough question. Very 
tough.” 
Regarding the question of community sentiment, community members tended to 
argue and express more negative feelings with a strong tone of voice, and concerns over 
the security of their communities. In comparison to the individual questions presented to 
them as about “you,” and when they answered the questions presented to them as about 
their “community,” they expressed feelings and opinions of opposition, such as a 
wariness of ex-combatants. Their cautiousness over the risk of being attacked by Al-
Shabaab was conspicuous. Munira, female, 26 years old, stated that “They are a 
problem. We are scared. If we touch Al-Shabaab member, they will come. They should 
not come back here.” After an explanation of the rehabilitation program, she still 
believed that “Yeah, after rehabilitation, even after rehabilitation, we cannot believe 
them. Community will be at risk. This is true. (…). Al-Shabaab will come and kill us.” 
Raska, male youth, 24 years old, also explained that “There is no chance for the 
community. Even if, no. (…). Can you accept the person who killed your brother? (…). 
Even if he is the same clan as us, no.” He further stated that “Yes, even same age and 
same youth like me. Think Al-Shabaab’s ideology. They kill people many ways!” 
In spite of these concerns, many interviewees felt able to accept ex-combatants if  
they met certain conditions. These conditions were diverse, ranging from the acquisition 
of skills to the making of a guarantee to their families that they would behave normally. 
One of example is Muna, female, 23 years old, who gave her opinion that “If they have 
skills, no problem. Perfectly no problem. People join to Al-Shabaab to get money 
because they don’t have skills! Not heart. It’s economic! That’s why if they have skills, 
you know something like driver skill, it’s fine.” Nevertheless, all interviewees 
understood fully that most of the members of Al-Shabaab join the group just for money 
such as Hassan, male, 35 years old, who stated clearly that “They are just money first 
people. Main reason of joining is for money. Also, they were threatened to join by force 
for money.” He depicted their situation that “They were poor in a village and that boys 
need to get money. Al-Shabaab is always looking for such young boys. We know it. It’s 
clear.” 
Contrary to such assumptions over reasons for joining Al-Shabaab, their 
evaluation criteria for whether they could believe a former combatant or not varied 
considerably. For example, the presence or absence of skills, voluntarism, physical 
appearance, employment, participation in and contribution to the community, and a 
minimum time from disengagement, such as five years. For instance, Arai, male, 30 
years old, explained his criteria that “We can see who is ok now or whether bad, from 
their face… and yes behavior! (…). Yes, it’s very easy to see that. If he is Somali like me, 
we can do it.” On the other hand, male community worker Yusuf, 51 years old, stated 
that “As long as they are voluntary defectors, I can believe them. Because they changed 
already. But, if they are not voluntary…like detainee…something like that…I won’t 
believe them. I know prison quality is terrible. Non-voluntary detainees don’t change 
their mind.” About their reintegration, his idea was that “For reintegration, their family 
and clan should guarantee them. After that, reintegration will happen little by little.” 
Moreover, answers to the question about necessary conditions for achieving the 
successful reintegration of ex-combatants were also diverse including: a complete denial 
of the possibility; the introduction of another rehabilitation program phase as a further 
buffer to occupy time; the provision of a guarantee by the disengaged combatant’s 
family and clan; the ability to return to their clan; a discussion involving all community 
members; the provision of skills and labour; and the belief in ex-combatants by their 
communities. As for Sarah, female, 28 years old, her idea was that “If they do good 
things for the community, it’s ok. But if they don’t do that, not ok. (…). Do good to 
community show they are ok now.” She added that “I don’t care their clan and job. 
Important is life in community.” 
In addition, opinions about how to prevent disengaged combatants from rejoining 
were also varied. For instance, to let them have a job, to hold them by their family and 
clan ties, to put them into a community, to solve environmental problems such as 
starvation and poor health, and to conduct monitoring. Daya, female, 25 years old, 
stated that “His clan and family should care. (...) Somali lives with clan. So if his clan 
are, and family, with him, he cannot back to Al-Shabaab.” She also mentioned a 
reference person, firmly stating, “His clan leader should take care of him. Leader need 
to do this for him and us.” On the other hand, Shino, female, 37 years old, said that 
“They need to be a member of the community, and we need to accept them into the 
community.” She acknowledged that “No one live without their community. Even me I 
cannot live without my community (…) So, prevention [of rejoining in Al-Shabaab], 
community is key, for their condition.” The most popular answer was monitoring, and 
there was even a suggestion of brainwashing. Dea, female, 28 years old, suggested that 
“For prevention [of rejoining in Al-Shabaab], the government should monitor them. 
They cannot do bad actions with monitoring. (…) Their monitoring should be long 
term...4 years. Government needs help for that.” Regarding the rehabilitation program, 
only 12 interviewees were not aware of the existence of the program, and all 
interviewees had no knowledge of the content and system involved in it. 
Community members were discerning in only accepting ex-combatants, assessing 
any accompanying risks, and taking steps to achieving successful reintegration; in terms 
of the latter especially, the feelings of community members became more cautious and 
wary. Given the fact that many individuals suggested monitoring to prevent further 
rejoining of Al-Shabaab, it can be inferred that community members generally regard 
disengaged combatants as a risk. Their responses as community members, not as 
individuals, reflect that they are circumspect about the potential risks of ex-combatants 
inviting attacks by Al-Shabaab. Also, like participants in the rehabilitation program, 
community members spoke in a manner that was quite assertive, without pausing. Table 
2 is the codebook of the interviews. 
The Gap Between Disengaged Combatants and Community Members 
As it is believed that most of the low-risk disengaged combatants joined Al-
Shabaab for financial reasons (Author, interview with UN officials from the UNSOM 
office in Mogadishu, April 2019), after acquiring the skills and education that were the 
main cause of their financial difficulty, disengaged combatants in the program 
developed a confident foundation to reintegrate into the community. Of course, they 
also understand the need to make the effort to build relationships with community 
members through explanation and hard work. At any rate, however, they do not have 
any doubt that their future is positive, showing significant expectations and confidence 
for immediate reintegration (Author, interview with with a Somali government official, 
April 2019). This trend can even be seen in the reports of practitioners, such as the 
International Organization for Migration (2019) and Khalil et al. (2019). 
 The conditions for successful reintegration which people in a community 
consider, however, are not only financial and relationship matters. They also include 
other multifaceted points that disengaged combatants do not perceive. While it is highly 
likely that community members understand the reason why the combatants became 
members of Al-Shabaab in terms of the financial aspects, when considering the 
reintegration process and assessing the accompanying risk of incidents, they attach   
Table 2 
The codebook of interviews with community members  
 
 
Category Sub-category Description Data example
Fear
Thinking about the risk
of being attacked by
Al-Shabaab.
They are problem. We are scared. They should not
back to here. (…). Yeah, after rehabilitation, even
after rehabilitation, we cannot believe them.
Community will be at risk. (…). Al-Shabaab will





 I cannot trust them no matter which position he
was in. Whether he works as service provider, or
whether as carpenter, or whether as combat, I
cannot do once he was in there. Because they have





 It is mixed emotion… Given what they did, I feel
fear in fact. They could be a spy… I know such
example! (…). I know AMISOM and NISA and…
will protect me. But, as personal level, I feel fear.
It’s tough question. Very tough.
Negative feelings about
disengaged combatants
from a community point
of view
Fear
Thinking about the risk
of being attacked by
Al-Shabaab.
There is no chance for community. Even if, no.
(…). Can you accept the person who killed your








They are just money first people. Main reason of





skills and a job.
If they have skills, no problem. Perfectly no
problem. People join to Al-Shabaab to get money
because they don’t have skills! Not heart. It is
economic! That’s why if they have skills, you know





As long as they are voluntary defectors, I can
believe them. Because they changed already. But,
if they are not voluntary…like detainee…
something like that…I will not believe them. I
know prison quality is terrible. Non-voluntary
detainees don’t change their mind. (…). For
reintegration, their family and clan should
guarantee them. After that, reintegration will





We can see who is ok now or whether bad, from
their face…and yes behaivor! (...) Yes, it's very





If they do good things to community, it’s ok. But if
they don’t do that, not ok. (…). Do good to






Having job is top. When he has a job, he will not





from a clan and family.
His clan and family should care. (...) Somali lives
with clan. So if his clan are, and family, with him,





They need to be member of community, and we
need to accept them to community. To prevention,





If they are hungry and need money for health, they
go back to Al-Shabaab for money! (…) It is easy





For prevention (of rejoining in Al-Shabaab), the
government should do monitoring them. (…) Their





Their ideology is influenced by Al-Shabaab. So









importance to various points, such as the monitoring and detention of former 
combatants with the group. In short, the community has concerns, fears, and doubts 
about the many risks that the reintegration of these people could expose them to. 
It is evident from these opinions that disengaged combatants fail to appreciate the 
emotions and views of community members. In other words, rehabilitation participants, 
who possess skills and education that they previously did not, regard themselves as all 
set for reintegration, and are unaware of the other necessities that the community 
expects. This fact is no less than harmful to the prospect of their achieving successful 
reintegration, for it means that there is the possibility of unexpected circumstances 
arising for both the disengaged combatants and the community members. The gap in 
understanding and assumption between ex-Al-Shabaab combatants and community 
members can generate discord between them, which could have more serious 
consequences than a lack of employment (Themnér, 2013), such as disillusionment 
among disengaged combatants, which is a very significant factor for disengagement 
from terrorism (Bjørgo, 2011; Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Reinares, 2011), and also for 
reintegration. For example, in Afghanistan, ex-Taliban fighters are currently facing the 
double disillusionment of personal insecurity and economic challenges, and these 
circumstances promote their returning to such a militia (Bahman & Torjesen, 2012). 
This explains why the progress of reintegration in third-generation DDR in Somalia has 
actually been “very little,” although it has made various improvements in these three 
years (Author, interview with with a Somali government official, April 2019). 
Lack of Knowledge 
There are two direct causes of the severe gap mentioned above. First, it should be 
noted that a lack of knowledge among disengaged combatants and the community is one 
of them. There has been extensive discussion globally about the process of 
radicalizations, as well as the causes behind members enlisting in a terrorist 
organization. In terms of the causes behind members joining Al-Shabaab, they are not 
only financial, but also involve various emotional and religious factors, such as anger 
and mistrust towards the Somali government, a sense of crisis over Islam, and a desire 
to change the political system (Anderson & McKnight, 2015; Botha & Abdile, 2014). 
Accordingly, in order to disengage such members from a terrorist group, some 
researchers, such as Horgan (2009), argue that psychological factors, mainly 
disillusionment, are key. Ordinary citizens in Somalia, however, do not have any access 
to the internet, newspapers, television, or lectures as sources of knowledge; their 
sources of information are typically limited to radio and small talk in daily life, which 
means that almost all community members have no accurate knowledge about joining 
or leaving Al-Shabaab. Hence, they only have their own ideas, which are formed by 
their personal experiences. Contrary to popular assumption, the reality is more 
complicated, in that there are not only combatants who join for money, but also other 
types of combatants in the rehabilitation program, such as those who join for reasons of 
clan hatred. Also, the categorization of combatants by NISA is not perfect, but rather 
notorious (Felbab-Brown, 2015a; Felbab-Brown, 2018). Furthermore, community 
members have been unaware of the macro-level systems of rehabilitation, including the 
system of amnesty for Al-Shabaab combatants, as well as the content of the 
rehabilitation program. Such a lack of knowledge in these areas among the community 
can be given as one of the factors that are impeding reintegration. 
Simultaneously, a lack of knowledge on the part of disengaged combatants is also 
problematic for successful reintegration, in that they cannot conceptualize the reality of 
life in the community. In interviews, most of them did not exhibit doubt or anxiety, but 
rather had strong confidence and positive expectations based on their skills and 
education. Despite this, they need to know more about the views of other people, not  
 
just their own. It is critical to be aware of mutual misunderstanding, and to prevent false 
assumptions that increase the risk of reintegration being undermined after rehabilitation. 
Lack of Accountability and Transparency 
Second, it is clear that a lack of accountability for communities is another serious 
problem. It is true that rehabilitation efforts for disengaged combatants in Somalia are 
very sensitive, taking into account that Al-Shabaab has attacked such disengaged 
combatants in retaliation for their betrayal, and that rehabilitation effectively amounts to 
nothing less than a reduction in the power of Al-Shabaab (Author, interview with with 
Somali government officials, April 2019). Therefore, it makes sense that much 
information is not available to the public. 
Such an inclination to hide everything can at the same time pose a risk to 
successful reintegration in the context of current DDR in Somalia. This is because, as 
long as community members have a negative view of disengaged combatants, it is 
necessary to make efforts to improve such views; if these efforts are not made, or are 
insufficient, the community is left without any measures to reconcile underlying 
negative attitudes towards ex-combatants. In fact, a lack of transparency in DDR 
measures in Somalia has already been pointed out (Felbab-Brown, 2015a; Felbab-
Brown, 2018). In practice, there are some representatives of civil society in a graduate 
ceremony in Baidoa center, but the kind of information that such representatives 
receive, and the extent to which they explain this information to their community is 
unclear. Moreover, the past histories of disengaged combatants tend to remain concealed 
when they are transferred to a community. Taking into account the controversial nature 
of and potential risk to disengaged combatants, as well as the difficulties in monitoring 
them and securing their safety, hiding information on participants in rehabilitation may 
be considered reasonable. Even so, however, there is a concurrent need to deal with the 
risks that this can entail. At present, a community must simply accept ex-combatants, 
without any right to veto decisions, nor any sufficient support, protection, and 
monitoring; they are left to face the threat of Al-Shabaab on the ground. A lack of 
proper transparency or supplementary measures has contributed to the debate over 
reintegration of disengaged combatants on the scene. 
Further Surrounding Problems 
Severe Unemployment 
In reality, there are other environmental issues surrounding the current DDR in 
Somalia that have undermined reintegration. First of all, it can be presumed that we 
need to be more sceptical and cautious about the belief that participants will be able to 
obtain sustainable employment and income, as long as they complete vocational 
training in a rehabilitation program. Due to the real effectiveness of vocational and 
skills training, this has been one of the major problems in DDR since the second 
generation. For example, according to the statistical data of the World Bank regarding 
DDR in Sierra Leone, only 28% of DDR participants were able to attain employment in 
which they could utilize skills that they learned in a DDR program (International Crisis 
Group, 2003). 
The economic situation in Somalia is far worse than in Sierra Leone. In general, 
the unemployment rate for 14- to 29-year-olds in Somalia is 67%, and this rate is one of 
the highest in the world (United Nations Development Program, 2015). It means that the 
number of jobs available to young people, who are the main age group that join Al-
Shabaab (Botha & Abdile, 2014), is very limited. Moreover, in achieving reintegration, 
the important point is the number of employment opportunities in the community 
available to a disengaged combatant. If the number of job opportunities for disengaged 
combatants is insufficient, it is very likely that practical skills alone will not be 
sufficient to get a job. Furthermore, though some participants exhibited a desire to 
become a “businessman” in the author’s interviews, they did not clarify their image of a 
businessman. That is to say, such an image could not be of a simple job such as a 
carpenter; it is possible that they have a longing to be a stylish and wealthy 
businessman. Since the collapse of the government in 1991, such individuals have 
become powerful in Somalia. Moreover, the research findings of Horgan (2009), who 
asserts that deradicalizations does not mean returning to pre-radicalizations status, 
imply that a situation after disengagement could be tougher for former members of Al-
Shabaab than the situation before they joined this group. In this case, although 
disengaged combatants may have a high degree of confidence and expectation, if they 
cannot attain a job in a community, the disillusionment that they will feel can be 
regarded as a serious risk for the process of reintegration. 
Security and Financial Limitations 
Second, as long as people in communities that will accept ex-combatants feel 
concern for them and fear of an attack by Al-Shabaab (International Organization for 
Migration, 2019; Khalil et al., 2019), monitoring and protection (Felbab-Brown, 2015b; 
Hedayah & Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2014) will be needed to realize 
successful reintegration, even if it is hard to access such communities due to the severe 
security situation. As a matter of fact, terrorists tend to be recidivists (Pluchinsky, 2008), 
and disengagement does not need deradicalizations and repentance (Horgan, 2009); 
deradicalizations can be accomplished only through the preventing of re-radicalizations. 
If so, this implies a need to reinforce the prevention of re-radicalizations and the 
rejoining of ex-combatants, more so than previous generations of DDR. As well as such 
measures, it is necessary to prevent retaliation attacks by Al-Shabaab, which lower 
morale and bias views on disengaged combatants. 
Somalia remains in active conflict with Al-Shabaab. Even in big cities, such as 
Mogadishu, Baidoa, Belet Weyne, and Kismayo, which Somali government forces have 
recaptured from Al-Shabaab in the past five years, there are many Al-Shabaab spies in 
the cities (Author, interview with with a UN official from the UNSOM office, April 
2019), and the government and AMISOM troops cannot go out from each city as they 
are surrounded by Al-Shabaab (Sieff, 2016b). In brief, there is a limit to the realization 
of appropriate monitoring and protection, due to such a tight security situation. One 
example of the severity of the situation is that when it becomes difficult to access places 
as little as 50 km away from Mogadishu to which disengaged combatants may be 
designated to return, the only available way of monitoring them is by telephone check 
(Author, interview with with a Somali government official, April 2019). Such a physical 
limitation has a devastating influence on other approaches in Somalia, and on the 
possibility of implementing some methods for reintegration in other DDR programs. 
As well as a security issue, there is a financial one. Regardless of the fact that 
reintegration is very long and multifaceted process, the financial difficulty of it has been 
decried internationally. As well as these issues, the national disengaged combatants 
program in Somalia has also suffered from a lack of funds; inadequate funding has a 
negative impact on support and monitoring activities and having a full quota of staff in 
the team (Author, interview with with a Somali government official, April 2019). In 
general, even salary payments for Somali government officials are also exceedingly 
unstable (Author, interview with with Somali government officials, April 2019). Hence, 
financial fragility in various areas is exerting a negative effect on reintegration efforts in 
Somalia. 
Distrust of The Somali Government 
Third, it can be proposed that another negative factor is citizens’ distrust of the 
current Somali administration. Throughout the author’s interviews and conversations 
with people in Somalia, more than a few were distrustful of their government. Many 
ordinary citizens on the ground claimed, in low voices, the existence of corruption with 
Al-Shabaab. In general, in the implementation of third-generation DDR, to ensure the 
credibility of interlocutors (Fink, 2015) and to build trust are essential (Botha & Abdile, 
2014). It is critical to prevent corruption in rehabilitation facilities (International Crisis 
Group, 2007), therefore, distrust of the government of Somalia, a main actor of 
rehabilitation and reintegration, could be a fatal wound for DDR efforts internally and 
internationally. 
As a background cause of distrust is the presence of severe corruption in Somalia, 
which has lasted for two decades. The state has recorded the worst corruption rate in the 
world (Transparency International, 2019), and even now, the amount of corruption tax 
of the state is the highest in the world (Author, interview with a UN official from the 
UNSOA office in Mogadishu, April 2019). In this context, people on the street see 
through the façade that politicians are always glamorous, in contrast with the 
unchanging serious circumstances of Somalia on the ground. Moreover, all people who 
mentioned such corruption issues said that victims of terrorist activity by Al-Shabaab 
are usually political enemies of the current government, and indicated the connection 
between the government and Al-Shabaab. Whether such opinions are correct or not is 
unknown, however, in any case, the fact that many people have a distrust of the 
government may be linked to a feeling of doubt over the rehabilitation program as well. 
This will certainly be an obstacle for the reintegration of disengaged combatants into 
communities where there are many citizens. 
Conclusion 
Based on qualitative interviews in the field, this study has broadened the 
understanding of various obstacles to the community reintegration of disengaged 
combatants through third-generation DDR in Somalia. In the context of very little 
previous research on this topic, it has realistically examined the conditions necessary to 
achieve successful reintegration for these combatants. In doing so, it has revealed a  
 
serious gap in their understanding of reintegration, and that of members of local 
communities. 
Qualitative interviews presented a contrast between ex-combatants, who held 
strong confidence, high expectations, and a positive attitude regarding their 
reintegration, and community members, who displayed uneasiness, cautiousness and an 
unwilling attitude. It also showed that a diversity of feelings and opinions exists on the 
subject, which disengaged combatants could not possibly comprehend before being 
released from rehabilitation centers. The GT analysis of these findings points out that 
such a gap is a critical flaw in the reintegration process, and elucidates the two 
fundamental facts that both parties do not have enough knowledge about one another, 
and that the accountability and transparency of the rehabilitation program are 
insufficient. It can be pointed out that, given the situation on the ground of third-
generation DDR in Somalia, such a gap can be more significant than previous 
generations of DDR, which makes the reintegration of disengaged combatants of Al-
Shabaab in Somalia more difficult. 
In addition to micro-level issues, the analysis indicated three macro-level 
environmental problems related to the gap in understanding between disengaged 
combatants and community members: severe unemployment, security and financial 
limitations, and distrust of the Somali government. These situational problems are some 
of the notable differences from previous generations of DDR programs, and widen the 
gap in understanding, consequently worsening prospects for reintegration in Somalia. 
The results of this study imply that, as a matter of course, it is quite difficult to 
implement DDR in the context of a lack of IDDRS preconditions for it. In other words, 
it is necessary to direct far greater resources to third-generation DDR than previous 
DDR in order to accomplish disengagement, rehabilitation, and successful reintegration 
programs under severe circumstances. Given the situation in the international 
community and Somalia, however, it is almost impossible to secure all the resources 
needed. Hence, on a practical level, it is better to conduct DDR on a realistic basis 
without any insufficiency, in that the inappropriate implementation of third-generation 
DDR can generate a variety of considerable risks for both disengaged combatants and 
the community, although it is necessary to secure resources and support to satisfactorily 
conduct a program to the minimum extent required. 
In light of the findings in this study, for the successful reintegration in this severe 
condition, it is essential to let disengaged combatants be realistic for their future before 
their release from a rehabilitation center. On this point, a comprehensive conflict 
resolution skills training that especially anticipates potential difficulties in the future and 
thinks about measures to tackle those is necessary. In terms of training in the 
rehabilitation program, simple skills training is not sufficient in the situation of Somalia, 
and that is why more practical life skills training, linking skills to a job, is needed for 
them. Then after their release from the center, long-term counselling with tailormade 
cares, such as trauma care and activities for their sense of belonging in their 
reintegration life is also critical.   
Also, given the importance of community for successful reintegration, efforts for 
people in a community should be seriously considered. It is better for the rehabilitation 
program to have cooperation from the side of the community, especially community 
representatives who can explain the situation and importance of rehabilitation to 
community members, such as dialogue sessions with disengaged combatants both inside 
and outside of the program for mutual understanding and forgiveness, which can fill the 
gap between disengaged combatants and community members. It can be insisted that 
such additional activities are necessary for the third-generation DDR in Somalia to 
fulfill their goals. 
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